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Abstract

The Political Clout of Wealthy American Indian Tribes

Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casinos on reservations have
become lucrative sources of income for not only tribal governments but also state
governments. With an increase in wealth, many tribes have increased their lobbying forces
to become major political actors in state and federal government. But, while some tribal
governments have become financially stable due to gaming others have become physically
and economically isolated making some tribal governments extremely poor. Poor tribal
governments continue to have problems and when lobbying is not an option grassroots
movements such as protests become the most viable source of political clout. By
examining the political power of both wealthy and poor tribal governments it can be
determined that wealthy tribes are more successful with traditional lobbying while poor
tribes are more successful with social movements.

When tribal governments become wealthy from gaming revenues they’re afforded
certain privileges that poorer tribes do not have. But, with these exclusive privileges
comes the pressure of maintaining these advantages. In order to hold onto the wealth
(and other advantages) created by gaming revenue wealthy tribes have established
themselves as significant political actors. Since the success of the IGRA (for some
tribal governments), many tribes have used traditional lobbying to increase their
political clout. According to William E. Schulter, lobbying “entails a group of
individuals or entities with a common affiliation working in concert to achieve a
favorable result” (Schulter, 2017). When an Indian tribal government has a connection
with lawmakers, via lobbying, it is more likely for political action to occur in favor of
that tribal government.

The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), was passed by Congress in 1988, this act set
the stage for tribal government-owned gaming facilities (Akee, Spilde, Taylor, 2015). The
passage of the IGRA gave many tribes economic sovereignty and the opportunity to
establish themselves as self-sufficient nations. Prior to the actual passage of the IGRA
federal courts had ruled on several cases between Indian gaming establishments and state
governments, the most notable of these cases was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians (480 US 202 [1987]). In this case, the US Supreme Court ruled that (p. 203):
The federal interests in Indian self-government, including the goal of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, are important, and federal agencies,
acting under federal laws, have sought to implement them by promoting and
overseeing tribal bingo and gambling enterprises. Such policies and actions are of
particular relevance in this case since the tribal games provide the sole source of
revenues for the operation of the tribal governments and are the major sources of
employment for tribal members.

While many tribes have had economic success from the results of the passage of the
IGRA, the majority of tribal governments do not generate considerable revenue from
gaming. In order to have a political voice in modern times, these poorer tribes can not
depend on traditional lobbying, so instead many tribes rely on social movements. Suh
Doowon explains that social movements “provide an institutional route to influence
state policy‐making and allows movement groups to forge political alliances with
reformist power elites within polity” (Doowon, 2006). Social movements can take the
form of protests, social media campaigns, or even boycotts. Without considerable
revenue from gaming poor American Indian Tribes increase their political clout by
these types of social movements.

Standing Rock
The Dakota Access Pipeline (the DAPL) was proposed to carry approximately 450,000
barrels of crude oil per day from the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota down to Illinois--it
would stretch 1,134 miles (Privott, 2019). The No Dakota Access Pipeline (#NoDAPL)
movement began because the Standing Rock Sioux reservation refused to allow that
DAPL to cross their tribal land and waterways (Privott). This refusal led to protests which
became a much larger social and political movement. Although the DAPL came to fruition
the movement that surrounded it became a blueprint for many other poor American Indian
Tribes, as a proven method to increase their political clout.

Conclusion
Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, many tribes
have expanded their political activity because of an increase in gaming
revenue. But the majority of American Indian Tribes are still considered
poor. Overall, American Indian Tribes have increased their political
clout. Wealthy tribes do this by means of traditional lobbying like that
of the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. While poor tribes resort to activist
movements like those seen at Standing Rock.

For the basis of this poster, tribes will be categorized into two groups: poor tribes (tribes
that have not generated considerable revenue from gaming establishments) and wealthy
tribes (tribes that have generated considerable revenue from gaming establishments).

Classification
Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: The majority of tribes in the US are
classified as “Poor Tribes,” under the previously
mentioned gaming revenues criteria. With the total
number of tribes in this data (n=501) the majority is
classified as being poor tribes (n=287) and the minority
being wealthy tribes (n=214). So, according to this data,
the majority of American Indian tribes in the US do
not generate considerable revenue from gaming
revenues.

The Puyallup Tribe is located in western Washington state, they have an enrolled
population of 4,000, of which 2,500 live on the reservation (NPAIHB, 2015). The
Puyallup tribe is considered a very urban reservation and offers a wide spectrum of
services and care for their population, mostly funded from revenue by their casinos, most
notably the Emerald Queen Casino. The revenue that has been generated from the
Emerald Queen Casino has helped finance many social programs offered on the
reservation, but more notably it has given the Puyallup the opportunity to engage in
traditional lobbying. From 2019 to 2020 the Puyallup Tribe of Indians spent $1,464,559 in
lobbying (OpenSecrets, 2020). For a tribe with only 4,000 enrolled members that is a lot
of money to give to government officials, and it gives those members a very loud political
voice.
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Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledges that gaming operations are the major source of
employment and income for many tribal members. This acknowledgment also promotes
Indian self-government, showing that the US policy had shifted towards granting
American Indian sovereignty through the economic means of gaming establishments. But
what happens when gaming operations aren’t successful on reservations?

● By using the National Indian
Gaming Commission’s data on the
Gross Gaming Revenue Reports for
the 2018 fiscal year, tribes can be
divided into categories of poor and
wealthy (NIGC, 2019).
● Poor tribes are classified by having
their tribal gaming revenue be less
than $25 million per year, because
this results in a median income of
<$16,280.
● Wealthy tribes are classified by their
tribal gaming revenue by more than
$25 million per year, because this
results in a median income of
>$33,580.

The Puyallup Tribe of Indians
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